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The Absorption Doctrine's Continued
Application In Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 Actions
Private civil causes of action brought pursuant to Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act are a judicial
creation.' As a result, neither provision contains a statute of limita-
tions.2 Consequently, all federal courts, with the exception of the
Third Circuit, use the absorption doctrine in determining the appro-
priate limitations period to apply to Rule lOb-5 actions.3 The ab-
sorption doctrine requires federal courts to look to state law for the
applicable statute of limitations period when federal law is silent.4
The circuit courts, however, vary in their application of the absorp-
tion doctrine. These varying applications of the absorption doctrine
promote potential forum shopping5 and create a lack of uniformity
throughout the federal court system regarding the length of the
limitations period applicable to Rule lOb-5 actions.6 The absence of
1. See Comment, Securities Regulation: Statute of Limitations Applicable to lOb-5
Actions Arising in Pennsylvania, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 70, 70-71 (1980) (both the Supreme Court
and Congress have acquiesced in the implication of a private civil cause of action).
2. See Fletcher, Learning to Live With the Federal Arbitration Act - Securities Litigation
in a Post McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 128 (1988); Schulman, Statutes of Limitations
in lob-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635, 636 (1966-67)
(Congress did not provide a specific limitations period since there was a lack of Congressional
foresight that an implied right would be created).
3. See Note, Statutes of Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1021,
1040 (1982). See also Beasley, Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied
Actions, 41 Bus. LAw. 645, 646, 659-61 (1986).
4. Bloomenthal, Statutes of Limitations And the Securities Acts - Part II, 7 SEc. & FED.
Cols. L. REP. 25 (April, 1985).
5. Beasley, supra note 3, at 647; Block & Barton, Securities Litigation: Statute of
Limitations in Private Actions Under Section 10(b)-A Proposal for Achieving Uniformity, 7
SEc. RE. L.J. 374, 378-80 (1979-80).
6. Beasley, supra note 3, at 646-47; Recent Decisions, Statute of Limitations in 10b-5
Actions: White v. Sanders, 34 ALA. L. Rnv. 131, 132 (1983).
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uniformity results from disagreement as to which type of state statute
to apply. 7 Moreover, the length of the limitation periods vary among
states using similar types of statutes, thus compounding the lack of
uniformity.8
Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a new
approach to resolve the conffict between the circuits. In In re Data
Access Systems Securities Litigation,9 the Third Circuit held that the
1934 Securities Exchange Act's analogous limitation periods for ex-
press causes of action should govern Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
actions. 0 The Data Access court stated that three recent Supreme
Court cases mandated this new approach." This recent federal case
gives rise to the question of whether the traditional "absorption
doctrine" should still be the appropriate method of determining the
applicable statute of limitations for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
actions.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the likelihood of Data
Access becoming the new federal standard for determining the ap-
propriate statute of limitations in Rule 10b-5 actions. Additionally,
this Comment will explore whether the Third Circuit's adoption of
a new federal approach was mandated by recent Supreme Court
decisions or whether Data Access merely reflects a permissible but
non-mandatory solution to the statute of limitations problem in Rule
10b-5 actions.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the background of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 causes of action in relation to the absorption
doctrine and the implied civil cause of action. 2 Part II of this
Comment will discuss the varying approaches the circuit courts have
taken when applying the absorption doctrine including the state blue
sky statute approach, the common law fraud approach, and the case-
by-case approach. '3 Part III of this Comment will discuss and evaluate
the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's reasoning and rationale in Data
Access.14 Part IV of this Comment will examine the status and future
7. Beasley, supra note 3, at 647-48; Comment, supra note 1, at 71; Block & Barton,
supra note 5, at 374-75.
8. Beasley, supra note 3, at 648.
9. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988).
10. Id. at 1545.
11. Id. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 18-52 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 53-114 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 115-88 and accompanying text.
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of the absorption doctrine in light of the Data Access decision.Y
Finally, Part V of this Comment will conclude that the Data Access
decision is defensible because if more widely followed, this new
approach would establish a uniform limitations period throughout
the federal system for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions.' 6 How-
ever, uniform application of a limitations period for Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 will not be forthcoming until either Congress or the
Supreme Court addresses this specific issue.
7
I. BACKGROUND OF 10B-5: IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE
ABSORPTION DOCTRINE
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act prohibit fraudulent and deceptive practices in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.' 8 The 1934 Securities and
Exchange Act 9 does not specifically provide for private civil causes
of action 20 for violations of Section 10(b)2' and Rule 10b-5. 22 A
15. See infra notes 189-210 and accompanying text.
16. Beasley & Chamberlain, Statute of Limitations Under Rule 10b-5, 20 REv. OF SEC.
AND CONIODIrTEs REG. 197-98 (Nov. 16, 1988).
17. See infra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
18. Comment, Securities Regulation: Statute of Limitations Applicable to 10b-5 Actions
Arising in Pennsylvania, 53 Taap. L.Q. 70, 71 (1980).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78u; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.0-1.
20. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 645 (no indication exists that Congress contemplated a
private civil remedy for violations of Section 10(b) when the Securities Exchange Act was
adopted in 1934). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (Section
10(b) does not expressly create a civil remedy for securities violation, and there is no indication
that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule lob-5 contemplated such a remedy);
Schulman, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13
WAYNE L. REv. 635 (1966-67) (lack of Congressional thought about a private civil right is
demonstrable of why even the most ardent defenders of implied civil liability under Rule 10b-
5 can cite no persuasive authority).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1989). Section 78j(b) provides in pertinent part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange- ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985). Rule lOb-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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private civil cause of action for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was
first allowed in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,23 and courts now
routinely recognize that a private civil cause of action exists for
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 24 Because Congress has not expressly
provided for a private cause of action for violations of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, the statutes are not subject to a specific statute of
limitations.5 Therefore, a court must find an applicable statute of
limitations when Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims are filed.26
In the 1946 Holmberg v. Armbrecht27 decision, the Supreme Court
promulgated the absorption doctrine requiring federal courts to look
to state law for the applicable statute of limitations when federal
law is silent. All federal courts, with the exception of the Third
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.
23. 69 F. Supp 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (judicially creating a private cause of action). Noting
that Section 10(b) did not expressly allow civil suits, the court reasoned that a violation of a
legislative enactment makes the actor liable for the invasion of another's interest. Id. at 513.
Because Congress did not specifically deny or withhold a civil right under the statute by clear
and plain language, the general law implied that a civil cause of action existed. Id. at 514.
24. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (existence of a private cause of action for violations of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 is now firmly established). See also Superintendant of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ("it is now established that a private right of
action is implied under section 10(b)"); Beasley, supra note 3, at 645 (a judicially implied
private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is settled beyond dispute); Note,
Defenses to the Statutes of Limitations in Federal Securities Cases: The Fraudulent Concealment
Doctrine and the Investment Decision Doctrine, 38 S.C.L. Rnv. 789, 792 (1987) (although
neither the Rule nor the statute expressly grant a private cause of action, every court considering
the question has implied a private right of action).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (neither provision contains a limitations
period). See also Martenet, Statutes of Limitations on SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 41 VIA.
L. Rav. 59 (1955) (the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 contain no provisions limiting the
time within which the SEC may institute proceedings for their enforcement); Fletcher, supra
note 2, at 128; Beasley, supra note 3, at 646 n.7 (no limitations period is provided because
the Securities and Exchange Commission itself is not subject to any limitations period in lob-
5 cases); A. JACOBS, 5C LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1OB-5 § 235.01 n.7 (1988 rev.
ed.).
26. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976) (generally, the law of the
forum state is followed when a federal statute has no statute of limitations). See also Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (Congressional silence as to a limitations period in a
federal statute permits judicial interpretation of the appropriate period).
27. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
28. Id. at 395. Congressional silence is interpreted to mean that federal policy requires
adoption of the local law of limitations. Id. (citing Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610
(1895)). The implied absorption of state statutes of limitation is a fashioning of remedial
details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination under familiar
804
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Circuit, use the virtually unquestioned absorption doctrine in deter-
mining the applicable state statute of limitations period to apply to
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions.29 However, the circuits are in
conflict as to what kind of state statute to apply. 0 For example, the
Second,3 1 Ninth,3 2 and Tenth 3 Circuits analogize Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 claims to fraud actions.3 4 Consequently, these circuits
apply the statute of limitations period for common law fraud.3 5 The
Fourth, 36 Seventh,3 7 Eighth,38 and Eleventh39 Circuits analogize Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims to state blue sky statutes and,
therefore, look to state securities statutes for the appropriate limi-
tations period/h The Fifth41 and Sixth42 Circuits apply a case-by-case
legal principles. Id. Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions under Section
10(b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed as in other cases of judicially
implied remedies. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976).
29. Beasley, supra note 3, at 646 (federal courts apply the absorption doctrine despite the
serious problems that are created by using this approach).
30. Bloomenthal, supra note 4, at 26 (discussing the conflict between the federal circuit
courts); Beasley & Chamberlin, supra note 16, at 197 (the limitations periods vary from state
to state between a minimum period of two years and a maximum of ten years).
31. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 1983) (for actions alleging
fraudulent violations of the federal securities laws the statute of limitations for common law
fraud is customarily applied); Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir.
1985) (applying California's limitations period for fraud).
32. See Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying
California's limitations period for fraud).
33. Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir. 1988) (this court
generally has applied the three-year limitations period for general fraud rather than the antifraud
provision of the state's blue sky law).
34. Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-61.
35. See id.
36. See O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying Maryland's one-
year blue sky statute).
37. See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 815 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir.
1987) (applying a three-year limitations period from Illinois' securities laws despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, which required proof of
scienter in Rule lOb-5 actions). See also infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing
the importance of the Ernst & Ernst decision).
38. See Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 360-61 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying
Missouri's two-year blue sky statute of limitations).
39. See Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987)
(citing Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500, 1507-09
(11 th Cir. 1986)) (for all federal securities cases the appropriate statute of limitations to borrow
is that of Georgia's Securities Act).
40. Beasely, supra note 3, at 659-61.
41. Compare Corwin v. Marney, Orton Invs., 788 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (5th Cir. 1986)
(applying Texas' general fraud statute) with First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n of Miami v.
Mortgage Corp. of the South, 650 F.2d 1376, 1378 (5th Cir. 1981), White v. Sanders, 650
F.2d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 1981) (both applying the two-year limitations period from Alabama's
blue sky statute); and Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 998 (5th
Cir. 1974) (applying a two-year limitations period from Florida's blue sky statute) with McNeal
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approach in determining which state statute to apply to Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 based actions. Consequently, these circuits apply
either the state's blue sky statute or the state's common law fraud
provision depending on the surrounding circumstances.43 Finally, the
First Circuit analogizes and classifies all Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 claims to personal tort actions and, therefore, applies the limitations
period applicable to those actions. 44
The inconsistent and diverse approaches taken by the federal
circuits cause a lack of uniformity regarding the applicable limitation
periods.4 - States compound this lack of uniformity by using different
limitation periods for the same kind of action.4 6 Moreover, the circuits
have added to the confusion by applying the federal equitable tolling
doctrine to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions under which the
running of the limitations period is not tolled until the aggrieved
party knew or should have known of the violation underlying the
claim.
47
Two approaches are used in determining which state statute of
limitations applies." One approach is the "resemblance" or "closer
analogy" test which requires an inquiry into the various elements of
each state statute to ascertain which statute is substantively closer
and more analogous to the federal statute.49 The second approach is
the "commonality of federal policy and purpose" test which requires
an inquiry into which state statute best effectuates the policies of the
federal securities laws.5 0 Regardless of the approach used, courts
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson, & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying a
four-year limitations period from Georgia's general fraud statute).
42. Compare Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 677-78 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying a three-
year limitations period from Kentucky's blue sky law) with Goudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F,2d
708, 711-12 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying a four-year limitations period from Ohio's general fraud
statute).
43. Beasely, supra note 3, at 659-61.
44. See Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying
Massachusetts' statute of limitations for personal tort actions).
45. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 648. See also Fiebach & Doret, Quarter Century Later-
The Period of Limitations for Rule 10b-5 Damage Actions in Federal Courts Sitting in
Pennsylvania, 25 Vii. L. Ray. 851, 854 (1980) (the absorption doctrine has created inconsistent
and disparate results).
46. See Beasely, supra note 3, at 648; Beasley & Chamberlin, supra note 16, at 197 (the
limitation periods vary from state to state with a minimum period of two years and a maximum
of ten years).
47. See Beasley & Chamberlin, Statute of Limitations Under Rule 10b-5, 20 REv. OF SEC.
AND CommoDrnls REc. 197, 198 (Nov. 16, 1988).
48. See A. JACOBS, supra note 25, at § 235.02 (1988 rev. ed.). See also Note, supra, note
3 at 1021.
49. See A. JAcoBs, supra note 25, at § 235.02.
50. Id.
1990 / The Absorbtion Doctrine's Continued Application
examine many of the same factors.5 1 However, even courts using the
same or similar language in formulating these guidelines differ both
in their interpretations of federal policy and in their assessments of
what features of a particular claim are most important for purposes
of comparison to state-law remedies.
5 2
II. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES TowARD THE APPLICATION OF THE
ABSORPTION DOCTRINE
A. State Blue Sky Statute Approach
Some federal courts apply the state's blue sky statutes as the
appropriate limitations period to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 viol-
ations. Blue sky statutes are state securities laws that were enacted
to regulate the distribution and sale of irregular securities.13 The
Eighth Circuit applies the individual states' blue sky statutes as the
appropriate limitation periods to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 ac-
tions. 4 This approach was first articulated in Vanderboom v. Sex-
ton.55
In Vanderboom 6 the court held that Arkansas' blue sky statute
should apply to Rule lOb-5 actions rather than the limitations period
found in Arkansas' general common law fraud statute. 1 The Eighth
Circuit stated that the state statute that best effectuated the federal
policy involved should apply." The state blue sky statute bore the
51. See Annotation, Applicable State Limitations Period in Actions Under § 10(b) of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lob-5, 72 A.L.R. FED. 763, 768 (1985). These
factors include the commonality of purpose between the two statutes, the similarity of the
scienter requirement, the parties protected by each statute, the parties liable under each statute,
the type of remedies available under each statute, the relative length of limitations periods
under each statute, and the effect of continuity on federal law. Id. at 768-83.
52. See Bloomenthal, supra note 4, at 26. See also Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-61.
53. See J. LONo, BLuE SKY LAW §§ 1.01-1.02 (1988) (the name is derived from the fact
that the state statutes were passed to control schemes which had no more substance than the
blue sky); BLACK's LAW DicTioNAY 157 (5th ed. 1979).
54. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-61.
55. 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970).
56. Id. Various investors in American Home Builders (AHB) stock brought an action
against sellers of the stock for fraud in connection with their purchase of the stock. Id. at
1236.
57. Id. at 1237. The blue sky statute required a person to bring suit no later than two
years after the relevant contract of sale. Id. The fraud statute required an aggrieved person
to bring a cause of action within three years from the date of discovery of the fraud. Id.
58. Id.
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closest resemblance to Rule 10b-5, because both Rule lOb-5 and
Arkansas' blue sky statute applied to both negligent and intentional
misrepresentations. 9 The court stressed the importance of this com-
monality of purpose between the state blue sky statute and Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5A" Specifically, the court noted the similarity of
the lack of defenses available under both statutes, and that both
statutes were enacted to combat securities fraud. 6' However, in con-
trast with the express language of the state blue sky statute, the
court applied the federal equitable tolling doctrine and held that the
limitations period began to run only from the date of the discovery
of the fraud, or from the date the fraud reasonably should have
been discovered.
62
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the state blue sky approach in In
re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litig.63 In Alodex, the court applied the
limitations period from the state statute that best effectuated the
federal policy underlying Rule lOb-5A4 In determining which state
statute best effectuated federal policy the court conducted a two-step
inquiry.65 First, the court inquired whether the state statute shared a
common purpose with Rule lOb-5. 6 Second, the court questioned
whether the state statute permitted the assertion of substantially the
same defenses available under Rule lOb-5 actions. 67 At that time, the
Eighth Circuit did not require proof of scienter in Rule lOb-5 cases;
therefore, the plaintiffs argued that because scienter was not required
for common law fraud actions, and was required under the blue sky
statute, the limitation period from the fraud statute should apply.
68
59. Id. at 1238-39 (applying the statute even though the court acknowledged that the two
statutes were not identical). At this time, the Eighth Circuit construed Rule lOb-5 as applying
to negligent and intentional misrepresentations. Id. at 1239-40. Under Arkansas common law,
however, recovery for fraud and deceit was possible only if the plaintiff could prove scienter
or an intentional misrepresentation. Id. at 1239. See generally Comment, A Cry for Help: The
Ninth Circuit and the Statute of Limitations in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 947,
954 (1975) (discussing the Vanderboom decision).
60. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1970).
61. Id. at 1239-40. On the contrary, a clear distinction exists between Rule lob-5 and
Arkansas' law of fraud since the former eliminates several available defenses to defendants.
Id. at 1239.
62. Id. at 1240. The court felt that the remedial policy expressed by Congress would best
be served by this equitable tolling principle. Id.
63. 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976).
64. Id. at 373.
65. Id. (applying the two factors from Vanderboom).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the five-year statute of limitations from the fraud
provision applied and, therefore, their claim was not time barred. Id.
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The Alodex court rejected plaintiffs' contention that scienter was not
required for common law fraud actions, 69 and affirmed the district
court's holding that Iowa's blue sky statute's two-year limitation
period had a commonality of purpose with Rule lOb-5 because both
statutes dealt expressly with the sale of securities.70 Additionally, the
court reasoned that the blue sky statute would more closely approx-
imate the federal policy and proof requirements of Rule 10b-5 actions
because the same defenses existed under the Iowa blue sky statute
and Rule lOb-5. 71 Accordingly, the court affirmed the application of
Iowa's blue sky statute because the common law fraud statute re-
quired the plaintiffs to prove an intentional misrepresentation which
allowed for a greater number of available defenses. 72
Subsequent to the decision in Alodex, the Supreme Court held in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,73 that scienter is a necessary element
in Rule 10b-5 causes of action.7 4 This holding was in direct conflict
with the then prevailing Eighth Circuit view. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit in Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc.7 5 reexamined its
prior case law in light of the Hochfelder decision to determine
whether the state's blue sky limitations period should still be applied
to Rule lOb-5 actions.
In Morris, the investor claimed that because of the decision in
Ernst & Ernst requiring proof of scienter, the Missouri common law
fraud statute of limitations applied since both the Missouri fraud
statute and Rule lOb-5 required scienter and Missouri's blue sky
statute did not.76 The Eighth Circuit held, however, that the two-
year statute of limitations in Missouri's blue sky statute still applied
and barred plaintiff's claim. 77 The court reasoned that Missouri's
blue sky statute bore the closest resemblance to Rule 10b-5 because
both statutes expressly dealt with the sale of securities, both pro-
scribed misrepresentations or omissions of material facts in connec-
tion with the sale of secuities, and both encouraged the policy of
69. Id. at 373-74.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 373. Since the Eighth Circuit did not require proof of scienter in Rule 10b-5
causes of action, negligent misrepresentations were actionable. Id.
72. Id. at 373-74.
73. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
74. Id. at 193.
75. 600 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1979).
76. Id. at 143. In Morris, an investor alleged fraud against a brokerage firm in connection
with the handling of her securities account. Id. at 140 n.3.
77. Id. at 140. The court asserted the continued vitality of Vanderboom, applying the
statute of limitations that best effectuated the federal policy at issue. Id. at 144.
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full disclosure of information in registration statements. 78 In addition,
the court noted that although Ernst & Ernst made available an
additional defense that was not found in Missouri's blue sky statute,
greater similarities of defenses alone did not require the court to
overrule precedent. 9 Furthermore, the court noted that commonality
of purpose of the two statutes weighed more heavily in the final
balance than did an additional defense, as long as the two statutes
did not result in two fundamentally different causes of action. 0
B. Common Law Fraud Approach
Some federal courts apply the limitations period from the state's
common law fraud statute rather than the blue sky limitations period
to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violations. The Ninth Circuit applies
the limitations period of the individual states' statutes applicable to
fraud for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions.8 The early decisions
were relatively simple since state blue sky statutes were not in
existence. 2 However, application of the absorption doctrine became
78. Id. at 143 (stressing that these concerns are critical in ascertaining a commonality of
purpose).
79. Id. at 144 (the Vanderboom analysis requires a weighing of commonality of purpose
together with the similarity in defenses). Because both Rule lOb-5 and Missouri's fraud statute
required scienter to be proven, an additional defense existed that did not exist under Missouri's
blue sky statute. Id.
80. Id. at 146. The court noted that although the blue sky statute was not identical to
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the two statutes bore a marked resemblance in both purpose
and substance. Id. The most recent Eighth Circuit case upholding the rationale of Vanderboom
is Harris v. Union Electric Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986). In Harris, a class of investors
sued a utility company for fraud in connection with the issuance and proposed call of the
Utility's first mortgage bonds. Id. at 360. The plaintiffs claimed that the prospectus for the
bond series misrepresented and omitted material facts regarding the call protection provisions.
Id. The utility company contended that the claims were time barred by the two-year limitations
period covered by Missouri's blue sky law because the action was commenced five years after
the bonds were sold and three years after the investors learned of a similar plan. Id. at 360.
The court agreed that Missouri's blue sky limitations period applied, but reasoned that the
two-year limitations period did not begin to run until actual or constructive discovery of the
fraud, i.e. the federal equitable tolling doctrine. Id. Actual or constructive discovery occurs
when the fraud is discovered, or upon reasonable inquiry, when the fraud should have been
discovered. Id.
81. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-61.
82. For example, in Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that the proper statute of limitations for causes of action under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was Washington's statute for common law fraud, since the
federal act did not provide one. Id. at 634. The court stated that to hold otherwise and use
the limitations period created by statute instead of for fraud would result in a triumph of
form over substance. Id. at 635. The Washington fraud statute provided a three-year limitations
period which would not accrue until the aggrieved party discovered or reasonably should have
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considerably more difficult after the enactment of varying blue sky
laws by individual states in the Ninth Circuit.
For example, in Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invs. ,83 the court
decided the issue of whether Fratt, v. Robinsonl was still controlling
or whether the limitations period in Washington's newly enacted blue
sky statute should apply.8 In determining the applicable limitations
period to apply, the court looked to the objectives of the substantive
federal statute and how those objectives could best be achieved.86 In
affirming the continued vitality of Fratt, and thus rejecting the
application of Washington's newly enacted blue sky statute, the court
held that the common law fraud statute was superior to the blue sky
statute.17 The court reasoned that the blue sky limitations period did
not allow for an extension of the limitations period for a reasonable
failure to discover the fraud, which conflicted with the policies of
the equitable tolling doctrine. 81 In addition, the court felt that to
change the limitations period with each change in the substantive
elements of a claim under local securities law would add additional
uncertainty to the Section 10(b) actions upon which aggrieved persons
had come to rely.8
The Ninth Circuit, in United California Bank v. Salik,90 also
declined to apply the limitations period specified in a newly enacted
California blue sky statute.91 The court listed three reasons for
discovered the facts constituting the fraud. Id. Additionally, in Turner v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d
44 (9th Cir. 1967), the Ninth Circuit first applied California's state statute for common law
fraud as the appropriate time period for causes of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5. Id. at 46. The court ruled that the three-year time period prescribed by section 338(4) of
the California Code of Civil Procedure should apply. Id. See Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton
Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1971) (discussing the Turner decision).
83. 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971). In Douglass an investor brought an action against his
broker and the broker's employer to recover damages due to fraud and misrepresentation
involved in the purchase of securities. Id. at 913.
84. 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
85. Douglass, 440 F.2d at 914-15.
86. Id. at 915.
87. Id. at 916.
88. Id. at 915. The court stated that although valid reasons might exist for limiting the
limitations period for state securities law, federal policy states that the limitations period
should not be tolled until the aggrieved person had a reasonable opportunity to discover the
wrongful acts. Id. See Comment, supra note 59, at 959-60 (noting that no circuit court at the
time Douglass was decided had determined that the statute of limitations would begin to run
immediately at the time the wrongful act occurred). The blue sky statute required the action
to be brought no later than three years after the consumation of the contract. Douglass, 440
F.2d at 915.
89. Douglass, 440 F.2d at 916.
90. 481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1973). See Comment, supra note 59, at 959-63 (discussing
Salik).
91. United Cal. Bank v. Saik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1973). In Salik, a purchaser
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retaining the common law fraud approach as the appropriate statute
for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations.92 First, the court con-
cluded that changing the applicable limitations period would add an
unnecessary uncertainty to the prosecution of federal claims under
Section 10(b). 93 Second, the court noted that the broad remedial
policies of the federal securities laws were best served by a longer
and not a shorter statute of limitations. 94 Third, adoption of the new
California statute would be piecemeal by necessity. 9 Finally, the
court pointed out that California's blue sky statute, which required
a suit to be filed within one year of discovery or within four years
of the transaction, conflicted with the federal equitable tolling doc-
trine which provided that statutes of limitations should run only
upon actual or constructive notice. 96
Since Salik, the common law fraud approach has been continuously
followed. 97 The most recent Ninth Circuit opinion is Davis v. Birr,
Wilson & Co., Inc.98 The court concluded that the three-year limi-
tations period set forth in California's general fraud statute barred
the investor's cause of action.99 However, in a concurring opinion,
of stock brought suit against a corporation's former shareholders for violations of federal
securities laws. Id. at 1014.
92. Salik, 481 F.2d at 1014-15.
93. Id. at 1015 (citing the reasoning and rationale of Douglass).
94. Id. (citing Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967)).
95. Id. Since the blue sky statute did not coincide with federal policy, the court stated
that it would be forced to judicially amend the four-year maximum or eliminate the one-year
provision and amend the four year provision to commence upon discovery. Id. The court
stated that to adopt a new statute under such circumstances would be piecemeal and not
preferable to continued utilization of the older fraud statutes. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Volk v. Davidson, 816 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Mosesian v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1984); Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc.,
649 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1980). In Mosesian, the court stated that applying a period other than
that in section 338 of the California Code of Civil Procedure to a securities fraud case arising
in California would be contrary to the law of this circuit." Mosesian, 727 F.2d at 876 n.5.
In Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co. and Volk v. Davidson, the court looked to the most similar
state-law causes of action and upheld their policy of applying California's general fraud statute
under section 338, subsection (4) of the California Civil Procedure Code in determining the
appropriate limitations period for federal securities violations under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 causes of action. Robuck, 649 F.2d at 644; Volk, 816 F.2d at 1411-12. The Robuck
court reasoned that an action for violation of anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws
most resembles an action for fraud; to trigger liability both the federal and state cause of
action must include a showing of intentional or reckless conduct. Robuck, 649 F.2d at 644
(citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
98. 839 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1988). In Davis, an investor brought an action for fraud
against a securities brokerage firm five years after he became aware of the alleged fraud. Id.
at 1370.
99. Id. The only significant question in the case was at what time the investor discovered
or reasonably should have discovered the wrongful act. Id.
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Justice Aldisert stated that analogous limitation periods found in the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 should be applied to Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 causes of action.' °
C. Case-by-Case Approach
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits use a state-by-state analysis and have
no settled approach throughout the circuit in determining the appro-
priate limitations period to apply in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
causes of action. 01 Before the Data Access decision, the Third Circuit
used a case-by-case approach in determining the appropriate state
statute of limitations to apply to Rule lOb-5 actions. 0 2 This approach
led to the application of either a state's common law fraud or blue
sky statute's limitations period, depending on the varying factual
circumstances of the case and the elements of either statute. 03 Using
this analysis, the Third Circuit held that the blue sky statute of
limitations was preferred over the common law fraud statute.' °4 If
an analogous blue sky statute could not be found, however, the state
statute of limitations for fraud should apply. 05
For example, Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co.'06 applied the New
Jersey common law fraud statute which provided a six-year limita-
tions period rather than New Jersey's blue sky statute which provided
a two-year limitations period. 0 7 The court observed that the New
Jersey Securities Act protected only buyers of securities and afforded
no protection to sellers or tenderers of securities, such as the plain-
tiffs. 05 In addition, the court noted that the blue sky statute had
nothing to do with fiduciary duties of officers, directors, or insiders,
such as the defendants, nor with frauds perpetrated by buyers or
tenderees in a merger.' 9 Consequently, the state's blue sky statute
100. Id. at 1370.
101. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-69.
102. See id. See also Annotation, supra note 51, at 798-801.
103. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-69.
104. Annotation, supra note 51, at 798.
105. Id.
106. 611 F.2d 450 (3rd Cir. 1979).
107. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 456 (3rd Cir. 1979). In Roberts, a
stockholder brought an action against a corporation and others to recover for securities
violations in connection with a merger transaction. Id. at 451-52.
108. Id. at 453. In reversing the District Court's decision to use the New Jersey blue sky
statute, the Third Circuit inquired whether a state court would entertain an action for the
relief sought. Id. at 452.
109. Id. Therefore, the court felt that whether a New Jersey court would apply the six-
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was not analogous since the plaintiffs were unable to bring a cause
of action under that statute in state court. 110
Additionally, Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.,"' ap-
plied the Pennsylvania statute of limitations for common law fraud
rather than Pennsylvania's blue sky statute since the latter did not
provide the plaintiff with a cause of action for the relief requested."12
The court reasoned that the allegations of the complaint gave rise to
a cause of action under both Section 10(b) and the Pennsylvania
fraud statute.13 Moreover, the state blue sky statute expressly stated
that the remedies supplemented rather than supplanted available
common law remedies."
4
III. A NEw FEDERAL APPROACH
A. The Data Access Decision: Holding And Rationale
In 1988, the Third Circuit in In re Data Access Sec. Litig."
5
abandoned the traditional absorption doctrine approach for deter-
mining the appropriate statute of limitations period applicable to
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 causes of action." 6 Sitting en banc, the
Third Circuit held that the applicable limitations period should be
year limitations period governing actions for common law fraud was unclear. Id. The common
law fraud statute is the closer analogy because the facts alleged in the complaint are actionable
under both the 1934 Act and New Jersey's common law fraud statute. Id. at 454.
110. Id. at 453 (the transactions alleged in the complaint state a cause of action under
state law for breach of fiduciary duty and for common law fraud).
111. 638 F.2d 605 (3rd Cir. 1980). In Biggans, an investor brought an action against a
brokerage house for churning in violation of federal securities laws. Id. at 605. Churning
occurs when a broker abuses a customer's trust and confidence for personal gain by inducing
transactions in the customer's account which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the
financial resources and character of the account. Id. at 607.
112. Id. at 609.
113. Id. at 610.
114. Id. The Third Circuit adhered to the reasoning and rationale of Roberts and Biggans
in Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3rd Cir. 1981). In Sharp, the court applied
the Pennsylvania common law fraud statute. Id. at 178.
115. 843 F.2d 1537 (1988).
116. Id. at 1151. In Data Access, purchasers of common stock brought a class action suit
against the issuer of the stock and the corporate attorneys and accountants who assisted in
the preparation and filing of the corporation's registration statement and 10-K Forms which
allegedly rontained misrepresentations of material facts. Id. at 1538-39. Plaintiffs contended
that the limitations period for their Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 causes of action should be
governed by New Jersey's six-year statute governing common law fraud actions. Id. at 1538.
The defendants argued that New Jersey's blue sky law with a limitations period of two years
should apply. Id.
814
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borrowed from analogous limitation periods of express causes of
action under federal law rather than from analogous state statutes
of limitations." 7 The court applied the prevailing limitations period
from companion provisions of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
which provided that a claim must be brought within one year after
the plaintiff has discovered the facts constituting the securities vio-
lation, and in no event more than three years after the commission
of the the illegal act."" The Third Circuit Court relied on three
Supreme Court cases to support this new approach: Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc.," 9 Wilson v. Garcia,120 and
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.12
These cases instruct that when a federal statute does not contain
a limitations period a court must first determine whether all of the
claims arising under the federal statute should be characterized in
the same manner, or whether a case-by-case approach should be used
in light of all of the surrounding circumstances. 22 Once this deter-
mination is made, courts should usually borrow the most closely
analogous statute of limitations from state law."2 However, state
statutes of limitations, in certain circumstances, can be unsatisfactory
vehicles for the enforcement of federal law. 24 In such circumstances,
when another federal law would clearly provide a closer analogy,
and the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation
would make the federal rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle
than any state alternative, the limitations period from that rule should
be borrowed.?2 This is the Wilson two-prong test.
117. Id. at 1550.
118. Id.
119. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
120. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
121. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
122. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that
federal rather than state law governs the characterization of federal claims. Id. at 262. The
Court held that section 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions. Id. at
276.
123. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc's., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987); Del-
Costello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72 (1983).
124. See Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147 (citing DelCostello); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161
(in those circumstances, adopting state rules that differ with the purpose or operation of
federal substantive law may be inappropriate).
125. See Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at. 147 (citing DelCostello); DelCostello 462 U.S. at 172.
In Malley-Duff the Supreme Court decided that the Clayton Act offered the closest analogy
to civil RICO because of the similar purpose and structure between the two federal statutes
and the clear legislative intent to pattern RICO's civil enforcement provision after the Clayton
Act's provision. Id. at 150-53. In DelCostello, the applicable federal statute was actually
designed to accomodate a balance of interests that were very similar to the interests in the
labor dispute of the case. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169.
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Initially, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the Supreme Court had yet to rule on the applicable limitations
period regarding Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions. 126 The Third
Circuit described the practical difficulties and inadequacies of its
present case-by-case approach, which resulted in the application of
inconsistent limitation periods applying to Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 actions within the Third Circuit. 127 To deal with these problems
of applying inconsistent limitation periods,'28 the Data Access court
followed the "two-prong" test set forth in Wilson v. Garcia.
29
Using the first prong of the Wilson test, the Third Circuit recog-
nized the necessity of establishing a uniform limitations period. 30
The Third Circuit reasoned that its present case-by-case approach
did not promote the federal interests in uniformity, minimization of
unnecessary litigation, and certainty. 13 A single characterization of
all Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims, on the other hand, would
minimize uncertainty and time consuming litigation.3 2 Consequently,
the court held that all claims arising under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 should be characterized in the same manner, and the single
most appropriate statute of limitations period should be selected.
33
Next, the Third Circuit applied the second prong of Wilson to
determine whether to apply a state or a federal limitations period.
3 4
The court first compared New Jersey's blue sky statute with Rule
lOb-5 to determine whether the blue sky statute was a satisfactory
vehicle for the enforcement of federal securities law. The court
126. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1539.
127. Id. at 1539-42. Some of the difficult practicalties and inadequacies of the pre-Data
Access approach include the difficult task of interpreting state limitation periods, examining
each securities law claim with great particularity, the wasting of untold hours of court time,
and the fact that no bright line exists to guide the district courts that comprise the Third
Circuit. Id. Additionally, depending upon the nature of the securities violation that a plaintiff
may choose to base his claim or claims upon, differing limitations periods might apply even
though both claims would be brought under Section 10(b). Id. at 1541.
128. Id. at 1543. The court wanted to modify its prior decisions in Biggans and Roberts
in order to be consistent with three subsequent Supreme Court cases. Id.
129. Id. at 1542. The two step approach of Wilson was explained in Malley-Duff. Malley-
Duff, 483 U.S. at 14647.
130. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1543.
131. Id. The court wanted to discontinue the pattern of inconsistency which had begun in
the Roberts decision where a seller of securities in New Jersey would have had six years to
bring his suit under Section 10(b), but a buyer would have had only two years under the same
statute. Id. at 1541.
132. Id. at 1543.
133. Id. at 1544. Uniformity is not accomplished by an approach when the limitations
period for each federal claim depends on the particular facts or precise legal theory of each
claim. Id. at 1543.
134. Id. at 1545 (using the DelCostello test that was followed in Malley-Duff).
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reasoned that New Jersey's blue sky statute was unsatisfactory be-
cause a question existed as to whether non-sellers of securities, as in
this case, could be held liable under the blue sky statute.'"
The court then compared the common law fraud statute with Rule
lOb-5 to determine whether the two statutes were analogous. 3 6 The
court declared that substantive differences existed between private
causes of actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and available
common law fraud actions. 3 7 The common law fraud statute required
plaintiffs to establish their case by clear and convincing evidence,
whereas Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 did not impose such an exacting
burden of proof on plaintiffs. 38 In addition, the purpose of federal
securities laws was to rectify the deficiencies and inadequacies of
bringing a federal securities law cause of action under available state
common law fraud theories. 39 The court concluded that far from
being identical to or a reasonable facsimile of common law fraud,
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 causes of action were clearly sui
generis. ' 40
Since neither of the state statutes provided a perfect analogy to
Rule 10b-5, the court had to decide whether to look elsewhere in
federal law to find an analogous limitations period. The Third Circuit
acknowledged that in two prior Third Circuit cases, two justices had
expressed a desire to adopt an analogous federal limitations period
but had felt bound by the Supreme Court's long acquiescence in
applying the absorption doctrine to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
cases.141 The Third Circuit noted that after these two cases, the
135. Id. at 1544. If the state blue sky statute did not provide a cause of action against
non-sellers of securities, and since Rule lOb-5 does, the blue sky statute would not be a
satisfactory vehicle for the enforcement of federal securities laws. Id.
136. Id. at 1544-45.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1544. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (a
preponderance of the evidence standard allows both parties to "share the risk of error in
roughly equal fashion").
139. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1544. Other differences included the fact that the two causes
of action are distinct breeds; that the classic tort of misrepresentations and deceit are completely
different from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule lOb-5 is applicable, and
finally that the antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coexstensive with common
law doctrines of fraud. Id.
140. Id. at 1545.
141. See id. at 1540. See also Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3rd Cir.
1979). In Roberts, Judge Gibbons expressed the opinion that much could be said in favor of
adopting a limitations period from analogous federal causes of action, but noted that the rule
of applying a state limitations period had been established for many years and that an inferior
court was not free to change it. Id. at 454. Judge Seitz noted that several commentators had
argued for the application of a limitations period from analogous federal statutes. Id. at 463.
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Supreme Court applied limitation periods from analogous federal
statutes to other federal statutes that did not contain limitation
periods. 142 Because the Supreme Court opened the door allowing
federal courts to borrow limitation periods from federal law, the
Third Circuit looked to the express provisions contained in the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to find an analogous limitations
period. 143
The court compared Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to the companion
provisions of the 1934 Act in determining whether these provisions
provided a closer analogy than available state statutes. The Court
first pointed out five similarities in purpose and policy between
Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the companion provisions contained
in the 1934 Act. 144 The court noted that Section 10(b) and its
companion provisions were aimed at the same objectives, 145 reflected
the same purposes as the original Securities Act of 1933,146 were
intended to compensate the same type of injury, 147 were enacted to
fill a void in the common law, 48 and were created to provide remedies
that would be uniform throughout the United States. 49 With respect
to this last factor, the court stressed that the limitations periods
found in the diverse body of state tort law and the plethora of state
blue sky law did not promote national uniformity of enforcement of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions. 50 Furthermore, the Third
Circuit stated that the companion provisions of the 1934 Securities
and Exchange Act reflected the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation, including the need for national uniformity
of limitations periods, the intent of Congress to create shorter and
absolute limitations periods, and the strong federal interest for plain-
tiffs to file suit quickly. 5' Consequently, the Third Circuit declared
Although he would have adopted this approach, he observed that since the Supreme Court
had rarely deviated from the rule of applying a state limitations period, neither should the
Third Circuit. Id.
142. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 151-52 (applying the six-month limitations period of Section
10(b)); Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 152 (applying the four-year statute of limitations from the
Clayton Act).
143. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1549.
144. Id. at 1548-49.
145. Id.
146. Id. The Act's purpose is to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent fraud




150. Id. at 1549.
151. Id. at 1545-49.
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that the companion provisions of the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act clearly provided a far closer analogy than available state statutes,
and the policies and practicalities of litigation were better served by
adopting the limitations period from federal law. 152
The Third Circuit concluded that since the Supreme Court had
directed courts to apply the most analogous federal statute of limi-
tations to certain federal causes of action, and in light of the
similarities of purpose between Section 10(b) and the Securities and
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, continuing to borrow limitations
periods from state law would be anomalous and bizarre. 153 Further-
more, any analogies to traditional state causes of action were bound
to be imperfect.154 In contrast, the federal scheme of limitations
expressly set forth in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 clearly
provided a closer analogy than available state statutes.' 55 Therefore,
the Third Circuit Court held that the limitations periods contained
in the companion provisions of the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act 56 should be applied to all Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions
arising in the Third Circuit.
157
B. Critique of the Data Access Decision
The Data Access court based its decision to borrow a federal
limitations period rather than a state statute on three main premises:
(1) All claims arising under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should be
characterized in the same manner; (2) neither the state's blue sky
statute nor common law fraud statute provided a perfect analogy to
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and both were unsatisfactory vehicles
for the enforcement of federal securities laws; and (3) the companion
provisions of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act clearly provided
a far closer analogy than available state statutes because the policies
and practicalities of litigation were better served by adopting the
limitations period from federal law. This section will discuss the
152. Id. at 1545.
153. Id. at 1549.
154. Id. at 1550.
155. Id. at 1545.
156. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 9(e), 78i(e) (manipulation of security prices); §§ 16(b), 78p(b) (profits
from purchase and sale of securities within six months); §§ 18(c), 78r(c) (liability for misleading
statements in any application, report, or filed document); §§ 29(b), 78cc(b) (validity of contract
provisions in violation of Act or regulations thereunder).
157. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545, 1548.
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strengths and weaknesses of each premise comprising the court's
conclusions.
1. Characterization of All Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 Claims
The Third Circuit correctly held that all claims arising under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should be characterized in the same
manner. However, instead of applying the absorption doctrine under
this new characterization approach, as nine other circuit courts do,l-s
the court utilized the second prong of Wilson: whether a federal or
state statute of limitations should apply to Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 actions. 159 The court could have solved the problem of applying
inconsistent limitations periods, however, by adhering to the tradi-
tional absorption doctrine approach and borrowing a state statute.
Since all claims arising under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would
be characterized in the same manner, the case-by-case approach would
be unnecessary; uniform and consistent limitations periods would
then apply within each individual state. 160 Moreover, characterization
of all claims will save time-consuming and unnecessary litigation.'
6'
This approach alone, however, would not have achieved the result
of applying uniform limitations periods throughout the United States
because state limitations periods vary in length.
2. Reasons the Court Looked to Federal Law Rather than State
Law
The court gave two reasons for concluding that the limitations
period from federal law (i.e. the companion provisions of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act) should be applied to Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 actions rather than available state statutes: Neither state
statute provided a perfect analogy to Rule lOb-5, and both were
158. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-61.
159. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267-68.
160. The Third Circuit was troubled that within a particular state, and particularly within
a single case, two different limitation periods could be applied to claims brought under Rule
lob-5. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1541.
161. For example, in the Ninth Circuit all Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 claims are
characterized in the same manner and, therefore, very few cases actually litigate the issue of
which state statute of limitations to apply. See infra, notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
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unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal securities laws. 62
a. Unsatisfactory Vehicles for the Enforcement of Federal
Securities Laws
The court properly held that New Jersey's blue sky statute was
unsatisfactory since non-sellers of securities, as the defendants were,
could not be held liable under the statute. 163 The Court's rationale
in dismissing the common law fraud statute is somewhat less obvious;
the facts of Data Access make it difficult to understand why Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions qualify as one of the few limited
circumstances where the state's common law fraud statute is an
unsatisfactory vehicle for the enforcement of federal securities law.
The Third Circuit merely discussed the differences between the New
Jersey common law fraud statute and Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
without stating why the plaintiffs would be unable to bring their
claim under the state's common law fraud statute.
In contrast, the Supreme Court in DelCostello specifically stated
that the state limitations period was unsatisfactory for the enforce-
ment of federal law; since a large portion of the damages would
remain uncollectible in almost every case,'6 the statute failed to
provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity to
vindicate his rights. 65 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Malley-Duff
specifically stated that there was a lack of any satisfactory state law
analogue to RICO.16 The reasons that persuaded the Supreme Court
to abandon the traditional absorption doctrine and look to federal
law in DelCostello and Malley-Duff do not appear to be present
162. Since the Supreme Court in Malley-Duff held that only in those limited circumstances
where state statutes are unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law should courts
look to federal limitations periods, the Third Circuit must have implicitly concluded that both
of the state's statutory limitation periods were unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of
federal securities law. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147-48.
163. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1544 (a substantial question exists whether non-sellers of
securities could be held liable under the state's blue sky laws).
164. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 168. The Supreme Court gave other examlles of when a
state statute has been declared unsatisfactory. Id. at 162. See Oxidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,
432 U.S. 355 (1977) (the Court declined to apply the state limitations period, reasoning that
to do so "might unduly hinder the policy of the [1964 Civil Rights] Act by placing too great
an administrative burden on the agency"). Id. at 367. See also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392 (1946) (the Court held that the state's limitations period would not apply because
the federal cause of action was brought under equity principles only, which are hostile and
adverse to the mechanical rules of statutes of limitations). Id. at 396.
165. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166.
166. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 152.
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under the circumstances of Data Access. Therefore, although differ-
ences appeared between the two statutes, the court's reasoning in
concluding that the state's common law fraud statute was unsatis-
factory for enforcement of federal securities law is unclear.
b. No Perfect Analogy
The court stated that the common law fraud statute did not provide
a perfect analogy to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 67 However,
DelCostello and Malley-Duff instruct that the mere fact that state
law does not provide a perfect analogy to the federal cause of action
is never in and of itself sufficient to justify the adoption of a federal
statute of limitations period.1 68 Moreover, the Supreme Court stated
that the norm for borrowing limitation periods is to resort to state
law unless no obvious state law choice for application to a given
federal cause of action exists. 69 In Data Access, the state common
law fraud statute was an obvious state law choice because the
common law fraud statute would have provided the plaintiff with a
cause of action as opposed to the state's blue sky statute. 70
The court in Data Access did conclude, however, that because of
the differences between the state and federal statutes, Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 causes of action appeared to be sui generis.' 7' The
Supreme Court used this language in Malley-Duff in concluding that
RICO did not have any state law analogue. 72
167. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1550.
168. See Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147-48. See also DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171. The
Supreme Court stressed that its decision to borrow a limitations period from federal law under
the particular circumstances of the case should not be taken as a departure from the normal
practice of borrowing limitations periods from state law. Id. Furthermore, the Court stated
that federal courts should not eschew use of state limitations periods any time state law fails
to provide a perfect analogy. Id. See also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 260 (1985) (although
the Supreme Court held that federal rather than state law governs the characterization of
federal claims, the length of the statute of limitations was to be borrowed from state law).
Id. at 261.
169. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147-48; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171.
170. The state's common law fraud statute was an obvious choice because common law
fraud statutes had been used to redress plaintiffs' claims in Biggans and Roberts and in other
cases. See, e.g., Ging v. Parker-Hunter Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49, 52 (1982) (applying Pennsylvania's
six-year statute of limitations for fraud actions); Fickinger v. C.I. Planning Corp., 556 F.
Supp. 434, 439 (1982) (applying Pennsylvania's common law fraud limitations period); Dof-
flemeyer v. W.F. Hall Printing Co., 558 F. Supp. 372, 379 (1983) (applying Delaware's three-
year limitations period of common law fraud).
171. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545.
172. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 153. The Supreme Court held that applying Pennsylvania's
"catch-all statute of limitations would be wholly at odds with ... the sui generis nature of
RICO." Id.
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3. Reasons for Applying the Companion Provisions of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Actions
a. The Policies and Practicalities of Litigation Are Better
Served by Applying a Federal Limitations Period
The Third Circuit stated that the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation would make the federal limitations period
a significantly more appropriate vehicle than any state alternative.
73
First, the court placed great emphasis on the need for national
uniformity of limitation periods for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
since federal law provides for uniform remedies under the Securities
Acts in all fifty states. 17 4 The court noted that almost all of the
companion provisions have the same limitations period which would
avoid intolerable uncertainty and time-consuming litigation. 7 5 Fur-
thermore, the existing necessity for uniform federal remedies in
security cases requires a concomitant necessity for a uniform federal
statute of limitations. 176 Applying state tort limitations periods or
blue sky limitations periods will not meet these goals.
77
Second, the Third Circuit concluded that because Congress had
declared limitations periods of no longer than three years for expressly
created securities actions, this same limitations period should be used
for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 78 This is a curious statement since
the Third Circuit voiced its displeasure with courts that formulate
judically-declared statutes of limitation and then suggest that this
would have been the intent of Congress had Congress created the
express cause of action. 79 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit used this
same approach to support its newly stated position.
173. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49.
174. Id. at 1549.
175. Id. at 1548 (except for section 16(b)).
176. Id. at 1549.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1546, 1550 (relying on Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987)).
179. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1547 (describing courts that resort to this "political science
fiction").
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Third, the court held that the three-year limitations period was
absolute. The court noted a strong federal interest in requiring
plaintiffs to file suit quickly once they have notice of the miscon-
duct.8 0 The absolute three-year limitations period contradicts this
interest and the principles of the equitable tolling doctrine that had
previously been recognized in all Circuits.' If a strong federal policy
requires plaintiffs to file suits quickly after receiving actual or im-
puted notice, an unsophisticated plaintiff may fail to discover a
highly sophisticated manipulative or deceptive act until after the
absolute limitations period has run.
182
Fourth, the court reasoned that the prevailing three-year limitations
period contained in the companion provisions of the 1934 Act re-
flected Congressional concern that a longer period of limitations
would allow lingering liabilities to disrupt normal business operations
and would encourage the filing of false claims . 8  The Third Circuit
concluded that a shorter limitations period was the intent of Con-
gress.184 This conclusion is questionable since other circuits have
expressed the view that a longer limitations period is coextensive with
federal policy.'85 In fact, the Supreme Court in DelCostello chose to
apply a longer statute of limitations period because the shorter time
period would not allow the aggrieved party a satisfactory opportunity
to vindicate his rights.8 6
Notwithstanding the considerable amount of support for the Data
Access decision to apply a uniform limitations period to Section
180. Id. at 1544 (citing Chief Judge Seitz in Roberts).
181. See Comment, supra note 1, at 82. See also Note, Defense to the Statute of Limitations
in Federal Securities Cases: The Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine and the Investment Decision
Doctrine, 38 S.C. L. REv. 789, 810-812 (1986-87) (discussing the tolling of absolute limitations
periods).
182. See Comment, supra note 1, at 82-83 (the equitable tolling doctrine allows plaintiffs
to bring suit no later than the limitations period after the individual discovered or reasonably
should have discovered the fraudulent act).
183. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1546 (quoting Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th
Cir.) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987)).
184. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1546.
185. See, e.g., U.C. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1973); Nickels v. Koehler
Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 1976); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams &
Peck, 518 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Comment, supra note 1, at 80 (a conflict
exists as to whether a longer or shorter limitations period is better). Some courts have reasoned
that the broad remedial policies of the federal securities laws are best served by a longer, not
a shorter, limitations period. Id. However, courts have reasoned that a shorter limitations
period is desirable because it is more analogous to the express limitations contained in other
sections of the 1933 and 1934 Securities and Exchange Acts. Id. See also, Note, supra note
48, at 1040-41 (discussing the differing views of whether a longer or shorter limitations period
best serves the broad remedial policies of federal securities laws).
186. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166.
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions, 1 7 the reasoning and rationale employed
by the Third Circuit construes and interprets the three recent Supreme
Court decisions in such a way as to arrive at a result that, although
needed, is not judicially mandated nor directed.
IV. FUTURE OF THE ABSORPTION DOCTRINE AFTER THE DATA
ACCESS DECISION
A. All Federal Courts Should Follow the Data Access Decision
The Data Access decision endorses the rationale that a national
uniform limitations period should be adopted for Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 causes of action. A uniform limitations period will
promote consistency in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases throughout
the United States and therefore will minimize time-consuming liti-
gation concerning the appropriate statute of limitations. In addition,
a uniform limitations period will promote certainty and consistency
since plaintiffs will know the time period in which to file their Section
10(b) or 10b-5 claim. These goals have considerable support through-
out the legal literature.' Whether or not the Supreme Court actually
"mandated" the decision in Data Access, the result is an answer to
a long overdue problem. Federal courts have been unwilling to adopt
a limitations period from federal law because no other court has
done so.'89 Now that the Third Circuit has opened the door and
taken the initial step in breaking away from the anachronistic appli-
cation of the absorption doctrine by applying a limitations period
from federal law, all federal courts should adopt the Data Access
approach.
B. Likelihood of Other Federal Courts Following the Data Access
Decision
The law is settled in eight circuit courts of appeal as to the
appropriate limitations period to be applied in Section 10(b) and
187. See A. JACOBS, supra note 25, at § 235.02; Beasley, supra note 3, at 657; Bloomenthal,
supra note 4, at 25-26; Block & Barton, supra note 5, at 380-81.
188. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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Rule 10b-5 causes of action. 190 As a result, plaintiffs have come to
rely on specific lengths of limitations periods in Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 actions. Since a circuit court opinion is only persuasive
authority rather than binding authority on other circuits, district
courts will be unlikely to follow Data Access. In fact, Data Access
has been cited but not followed in three recent cases. 19'
In TCF Banking & Savings v. Arthur Young & Co., 92 the Min-
nesota district court rejected Authur Young's argument that the
limitations period should be borrowed from federal law, as in Data
Access, and instead applied the state's blue sky statute, adhering to
the rule in Vanderboom.'93 The Minnesota district court noted that
at the time of the Data Access decision, the law in the Third Circuit
concerning the limitations period under Section 10(b) was particularly
confused and unsettled.1 94 Under the old Third Circuit approach, no
uniform limitations period existed even within the same state. 19
Furthermore, the Minnesota district court stated that the decision of
Malley-Duff, on which Data Access relied, related only to civil RICO
actions.196 The district court also pointed out that nowhere in the
Malley-Duff opinion did the Supreme Court intimate or suggest that
lower federal courts should apply a federal limitations period to
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.' 97 In Durham v. Business
Management Assocs., 19 the Eleventh Circuit continued applying Al-
abama's two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for the
fraudulent sale of securities. 99 The court merely dismissed the Data
Access decision as contrary authority and did not discuss it any
further. 200 In Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp. ,201 the court adhered
to the Seventh Circuit's consistent approach of applying the forum
state's blue sky limitations period.20 2 The court noted that despite
growing support for the adoption of a uniform limitations period,
190. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-661.
191. TCF Banking & Savings, F.A. v. Arthur Young & Co., 697 F. Supp. 362 (D. Minn.
1988); Durham v. Business Management Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988); Robin v.
Doctors Officenters Corp., 686 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. I11. 1988).
192. 697 F.Supp. 362 (D. Minn. 1988).
193. Id. at 366.
194. Id. at 365.
195. Id. at 365-66 (noting that the law in the Eighth Circuit is clear and more settled than
in the Third Circuit prior to Data Access).
196. Id. at 364.
197. Id.
198. 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988).
199. Id. at 1508.
200. Id.
201. 686 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
202. Id. at 206.
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courts have continued applying the relevant state statutes of limita-
tion. 203 The court further declared that the selection of a uniform
federal statute of limitations is a legislative task, 204 a view supported
by other commentators.
20 5
In light of these judicial decisions subsequent to Data Access and
the fact that eight circuits have settled rules concerning the application
of the absorption doctrine, circuit courts with settled rules are very
unlikely to adopt the Third Circuit approach and apply a limitations
period from analogous federal securities law in Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 cases. However, both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits still
use a state-by-state approach similar to the approach the Third Circuit
utilized before the Data Access decision. 201 Therefore, these two
circuits are likely candidates to adopt the new Third Circuit approach.
Since both circuits utilize the state-by-state approach, adopting the
Third Circuit approach would undoubtedly minimize uncertainty and
time-consuming litigation within their respective circuits.
The question arises as to the likelihood of the Ninth Circuit
adopting the Third Circuit Data Access approach because of a
concurring opinion in Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., Inc.207 The
concurring opinion articulated the same approach that was used in
the Data Access decision and applied the limitations period found in
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
actions.203 However, Judge Aldisert, the author of the concurring
opinion in Davis, wrote the majority opinion in Data Access. Judge
Aldisert is a Third Circuit Judge and was merely sitting by designation
on the Davis case. Therefore, Judge Aldisert's concurring opinion in
Davis is unlikely to have a significant impact on the application of
the absorption doctrine in the Ninth Circuit.
C. Likelihood of the Data Access Decision Minimizing Time-
Consuming Litigation
If all other federal courts follow Data Access, the problem of
uniformity will be resolved and time-consuming and unnecessary
203. Id.
204. Id. at 206-07.
205. See Beasley, supra note 3, at 647; Block & Barton, supra note 5, at 384-85; Note,
supra note 48, at 1046.
206. Beasley, supra note 3, at 659-61.
207. 839 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1988). See Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1442-
44 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (citing Judge Aldisert's concurrence).
208. Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988).
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litigation will be minimized. 209 Since, however, other federal courts
probably will not follow the Data Access approach, the Data Access
decision may only exacerbate the problem rather than achieve the
goal of minimizing uncertainty and time consuming litigation. For
example, defendants in jurisdictions with settled rules concerning the
application of the appropriate limitations periods will now use the
Data Access decision to try obtaining a possibly more favorable
limitations period: the absolute three-year bar. These attempts will
only add time-consuming litigation to federal court dockets which
until now would probably not have been filled with cases litigating
the issue of which statute of limitations to apply in Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 actions. In addition, very few cases actually litigate
the issue of which state statute to apply to Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 actions in the eight circuits that have settled absorption doctrine
approaches. Therefore, an argument exists that the Data Access
approach should be limited to the Third Circuit.
V. CONCLUSION
In In re Data Access Sec. Litig., the Third Circuit court held that
the proper limitations period for private civil causes of action under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was the limitations period found in
express causes of action from companion provisions under the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act. Consequently, the Third Circuit no
longer applies the traditional absorption doctrine. As a result, in the
Third Circuit, an action must be brought within one year after the
plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the violation, and in no event
more than three years after the transaction. 210 The three-year maxi-
mum is an absolute bar and the equitable tolling doctrine does not
apply.21
1
All federal courts should follow the Data Access approach since a
nationwide uniform limitations period for Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 actions will promote consistency throughout the United States,
minimze unnecessary and time-consuming litigation, promote cer-
209. See Beasley & Chamberlain, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
210. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1550.
211. Beasley & Chamberlain, supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also Comment,
supra note 1, at 82-83 (stating that this approach severely shortens the period in which plaintiffs
can validly file and bring a cause of action). Under the equitable tolling doctrine, the limitations
period does not begin to run until the person discovered, or reasonably should have discovered,
the wrongful act. Id.
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tainty in which buyers and sellers on both sides of the transaction
can rely, and prevent forum shopping.212 Contrary to the decision in
Data Access, however, federal courts should continue to apply the
equitable tolling doctrine to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions,2 13
since defendants often try to hide or conceal their wrongdoings.
214
Moreover, defendants that prevent plaintiffs from discovering the
violation early enough to bring a timely suit should not benefit from
an absolute limitations period from their own wrongdoing. 215
Other federal courts will not likely adopt the Data Access approach
since eight circuits have settled rules as to the applicable limitations
period to apply in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions. In the eight
circuits with settled rules, the confusion as to which state statute to
apply, as was commonplace in the Third Circuit before the Data
Access decision because of the case-by-case approach, does not exist.
However, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits do not have clear settled
approaches and therefore are likely candidates to adopt the Data
Access approach. The ultimate goal of the Data Access decision is
to establish national uniformity in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
actions. Many commentators agree that national uniformity in Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions is needed. Since, however, other federal
courts are unlikely to adopt the Third Circuit approach, the Data
Access decision alone will not accomplish this goal. Therefore, the
only answer to this problem is either for the Supreme Court to rule
expressly on this issue or for Congress to enact a uniform limitations
period for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims.
Craig E. Lindberg
212. See generally Beasley & Chamberlain, supra note 16, and text accompanying note 16.
213. Comment, Statutes of Limitations in lob-5 Actions: A Proposal for Congressional
Legislation, 24 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 1154, 1172 (1973) (any limitation period for lOb-5 actions
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